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I. Introduction
One of the many unsettled issues in relation to commercial surrogacy is 
whether a commercial surrogacy arrangement amounts to an unlawful sale 
of children in breach of article 35 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)1 and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (CRC-OPSC).2 For the purposes 
of this chapter, commercial surrogacy is understood as an arrangement where 
the surrogate is not only compensated for her expenses, but also receives a 
sum of money in addition to her reimbursable expenses. Some commentators 
assert that commercial surrogacy per se amounts to unlawful sale of children, 
while others argue that commercial surrogacy simply involves remuneration 
to the surrogate for her reproductive services rather than payment for a child. 
Many commentators agree that there is a need for regulation, whether it be 
at the national or international level. For some of those commentators who 
are of the view that commercial surrogacy per se amounts to the unlawful 
sale of children, then international regulation of the same is seen as largely 
redundant as it is already fully regulated by the prohibition in the CRC and 
CRC-OPSC.3
This chapter examines the tentative engagement of the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of the Child on this issue. To date, this has largely 
been via the Committee’s concluding observations on periodic reports of 
individual states where international commercial surrogacy is permissible (or 
at least not prohibited). Given that the prospects of a binding international 
 
 
1 Convention on the Rights of the Child 1577 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 20 November 
1989, entered into force 2 September 1990). 
2 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, 
Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 2171 UNTS 227 (signed 25 May 2000, entered 
into force 18 January 2002). 
3 John Tobin “To Prohibit or Permit: What is the (Human) Rights Response to the Practice 
of International Commercial Surrogacy?” (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 317 at 319.
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Canterbury. This chapter draws on research 
funded by the New Zealand Law Foundation. 
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agreement on surrogacy are extremely unlikely in the near future, this chapter 
argues that the time has come for the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
to show some leadership on this issue (and, depending on its conclusion, other 
child rights issues associated with surrogacy). It suggests that the Committee 
should build on the recent work of the Special Rapporteur on the sale and 
sexual exploitation of children,4 and issue a general comment on commercial 
surrogacy. Such a general comment would assist in providing guidance to 
states in developing their domestic regulatory responses to surrogacy in the 
absence of an international agreement. A general comment could also be 
useful groundwork to contribute to the work of the Permanent Bureau of the 
Hague Conference on Private International Law (Hague Conference) on a 
possible private international law agreement, and the work of the International 
Social Service Network (ISS) on developing a set of principles for protecting 
children’s rights in the international commercial surrogacy context.
The next section of this chapter explains the issue at stake in terms of 
whether commercial surrogacy amounts to sale of children. It then goes on 
to set out the key arguments of those who argue that commercial surrogacy 
amounts to sale of children, and those who argue that it does not. Following 
that, it looks at what the Committee on the Rights of the Child has said to 
date on commercial surrogacy, including whether or not it amounts to sale of 
children. The chapter then argues that the time has come for the Committee 
to adopt a general comment on surrogacy.
At the outset, it should be emphasised that of the myriad legal and ethical 
issues associated with surrogacy, this chapter considers just one, i.e. whether or 
not commercial surrogacy amounts to unlawful sale of children in breach of 
art 35 CRC and the CRC-OPSC. This means the issue is being considered in 
something of a vacuum. Ryznar points out that “…it would be very difficult, 
and perhaps unwise, to consider only the legal framework of international 
commercial surrogacy while ignoring public policy goals.”5  While I have some 
sympathy with Ryznar’s point, especially given the undoubted complexities of 
the surrogacy debate, there is still merit in considering this specific question 
in relative isolation – especially in the wider context of a contribution to 
a book on commercial surrogacy. If commercial surrogacy does amount to 
unlawful sale of children in terms of art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC, then 
either art 35 and CRC-OPSC should be re-negotiated to allow commercial 
surrogacy to continue, or commercial surrogacy should be prohibited. If the 
latter course of prohibition were taken, then this would arguably make many 
of the other issues in relation to commercial surrogacy redundant as they 
typically consider questions of regulation of commercial surrogacy either 
on the implicit assumption that it is a valid practice, or on the pragmatic 
4 United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual 
exploitation of children, including child prostitution, child pornography and other child sexual 
abuse material (A/HRC/37/60, 15 January 2018).
5 Margaret Ryznar “International Commercial Surrogacy and Its Parties” (2010) 43 J Marshall 
L Rev 1009 at 1024.
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basis that since it is occurring, it should be regulated. Alternatively, it may 
be the case that provided certain criteria are met, then commercial surrogacy 
does not amount to prohibited sale of children. If this is the case, then a 
clear statement from the Committee on the Rights of the Child to this effect 
would be welcome.
II. The Issue: Does Commercial Surrogacy  
Amount to Sale of Children?
Article 35 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic in children for any purpose 
or in any form.
The Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography, adopted in 2002, provides greater focus on the issue of 
exploitation of children. Article 1 of CRC-OPSC provides:
States Parties shall prohibit the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography as provided for by the present Protocol.
Article 2(a) of CRC-OPSC defines the phrase “sale of children” as:
any act or transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of 
persons to another for remuneration or any other consideration.
At first glance, the terms of CRC and CRC-OPSC appear wide and 
all-encompassing and as clearly covering commercial surrogacy contracts. 
A commercial surrogacy arrangement involves a ‘transaction’ where a 
child is ‘transferred’ from the surrogate mother to the intending parent(s) 
in exchange for ‘remuneration’ beyond reimbursement for expenses. This 
arguably amounts to the ‘sale’ of a child. However, as noted by John Tobin, 
interpretation of any human rights treaty is an “imprecise task”, and “rarely 
a simple exercise”. Tobin points out that the definition raises a number of 
interpretive dilemmas:6
For example, does the purpose of the ‘sale’ matter? Does it matter if the transferors 
and/or transferees have a biological connection with the child? What does ‘transfer’ 
mean and is a child actually transferred under a commercial surrogacy arrangement? 
Finally, is the remuneration paid ‘for’ the transfer of the child or merely ‘for’ the 
service of gestating a child?
To this list of issues could also be added the following: Does the timing of 
payments to the surrogate mother affect whether or not there is a ‘sale’ of the 
resulting baby? Can intending parents buy ‘their own’ children? Does it make 
a difference if the remuneration is paid via an intermediary rather than directly 
from the intending parents to the surrogate mother? Is gestational surrogacy 
6 Tobin, above n 3, at 335.
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somehow different from traditional surrogacy? Are expenses regarded as 
‘any other consideration’? Is compensation for losses such as time, physical 
symptoms, health risks, pain and suffering to be regarded as ‘remuneration or 
any other consideration’? Is there a material difference between commercial, 
compensated and paid surrogacy arrangements?7
An important point to note, which is unsurprising given the date of 
adoption of CRC and CRC-OPSC and the comparatively recent rise of 
surrogacy as a technique of artificial reproduction, is that neither the CRC nor 
the CRC-OPSC expressly mentions surrogacy.8  Nor was there any mention 
of commercial surrogacy during the drafting of CRC or CRC-OPSC.9 Until 
relatively recently (as discussed further below), neither the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child nor the UN Special Representative on the sale of 
children had considered surrogacy either. However, academic commentators 
have been prolific on this issue, and it is to their views that I now turn. 
III. The Arguments: Baby Selling or Womb Rental?
Surrogacy has generated a huge amount of academic commentary. But, 
until the last few years, the rights of the child in the surrogacy context were 
often overlooked, with much greater prominence given to the rights of the 
surrogate mother and the intended parents.10 References to human rights 
and children’s best interests tended to be “incidental and superficial rather 
than substantive.”11 This has changed in recent years however, with more 
attention being given to children’s rights. Strong views are held on all matters 
to do with surrogacy, and the issue of whether or not commercial surrogacy 
amounts to sale of children is no exception. The issue, as colourfully put by 
Watson, is whether or not commercial surrogacy amounts to “womb rental” 
or “baby selling”?12
7 On this last issue, see Julia Carrington and Debra Wilson “Commercialising Reproduction: 
In Search of a Logical Distinction between Commercial, Compensated, and Paid Surrogacy 
Arrangements” (2015) 21 NZBLQ 178.
8 For a discussion of historical antecedents to modern surrogacy, see David Smolin “Surrogacy 
as Sale of Children: Applying Lessons Learned from Adoption to the Regulation of the 
Surrogacy Industry’s Global Marketing of Children” (2016) 43 PeppLRev 265 at 289-302.
9 Tobin, above n 3, at 337.
10 For a summary of the shortcomings of earlier literature, see Tobin, above n 3, at 318, n 6. See 
also Claire Achmad “Contextualising a 21st century challenge: part two: public international 
law human rights issues: why are the rights and interests of women and children at stake in 
international commercial surrogacy arrangements?” [2012] NZFLJ 206 at 206.
11 Tobin, above n 3, at 318.
12 Clara Watson “Womb Rentals and Baby-Selling: Does Surrogacy Undermine the Human 
Dignity and Rights of the Surrogate Mother and Child?” (2016) 22 New Bioethics 212 at 
223.
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A. Contract for Sale of a Child
Over 20 years ago, in the early days of traditional surrogacy arrangements, 
child rights philosopher Michael Freeman noted that the child born of a 
commercial surrogacy arrangement was the product of a business transaction 
– “[t]echnically, the commissioning parents may be buying gestational 
services but they feel they are buying a baby.”13 It is this sentiment which 
underlies wider ethical and moral concerns that surrogacy amounts to 
immoral commodification. For example, writing in 1990, Holder argued 
that it was “repugnant” for children to be the topic of contracts and 
commerce.14 Similarly, the United Kingdom 1984 Warnock Committee on 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology determined commercial surrogacy to 
be a degrading practice primarily because “the child will have been bought 
for money”.15 The subsequent Brazier Report also argued that it was “not 
necessarily in children’s best interests to learn that their surrogate mother 
benefitted financially from their birth or from giving them away to the 
commissioning couple.”16
More recently, a strong proponent of the argument that commercial 
surrogacy amounts to the sale of children and is therefore prohibited by art 35 
of the CRC and CRC-OPSC is John Tobin.17 In response to what he regarded 
as an overlooking of public international law considerations in the work of the 
Hague Conference, Tobin argued in 2014 that there is a “strong argument to 
suggest that commercial surrogacy arrangements amount to sale of a child, 
in which case, international human rights law requires that this practice be 
prohibited.”18 He argues that for the Hague Conference to treat international 
human rights obligations as simply “needs to be met” rather than binding 
international legal obligations is problematic because it risks marginalising 
the role of public international law in resolving the issues associated with 
international surrogacy.19 
Tobin conducts a textual analysis of art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC in 
order to consider some of the interpretive issues noted above.20 He notes that 
although there is no mention of surrogacy in the drafting history of the CRC 
13  Michael Freeman “The new birth right? Identity and the child of the reproductive revolution” 
(1996) 4 International Journal of Children’s Rights 273 at 286.
14 Angela R Holder “Surrogate Motherhood and the Best Interests of Children” in Larry Gostin 
(ed) Surrogate Motherhood, Politics and Privacy (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1990) 77 at 77.
15 Mary Warnock Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(1984, reprinted 1988) at [8.11].
16 Margaret Brazier, Alistair Campbell and Susan Golombok Surrogacy: Review for health 
ministers of current arrangements for payments and regulation: report of the review team (1 
October 1998) at [5.18]-[5.19].
17 Tobin, above n 3.
18 Tobin, above n 3, at 326.
19 Tobin, above n 3, at 320-321.
20 Tobin, above n 3, at 335-341.
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or CRC-OPSC, the drafting history of the latter does make it clear that states 
wanted a broad definition of the sale of children to “cover activities beyond 
those contemplated at the time of drafting.”21 He argues that given the 
ordinary meaning of the terms ‘transfer,’ ‘remuneration,’ and ‘consideration’ 
in art 35 CRC, it would appear that a commercial surrogacy agreement falls 
within the definition of the sale of a child.22 His view is that the purpose of 
a contract for sale of a child does not matter, i.e. the fact that the purpose 
of (most) commercial surrogacy arrangements is non-exploitative does not 
exclude them from the reach of art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC. Similarly, he 
concludes that the identity of the persons involved in the transfer of a child 
is not relevant given the reference to ‘any person’ in the CRC-OPSC. Thus, 
even a biological father intended as the recipient of a child under a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement does not have an entitlement to custody, and so is 
potentially captured by the prohibition in art 35 and CRC-OPSC. Tobin 
also discounts arguments that a commercial surrogacy arrangement does not 
involve a transfer of ownership, and so cannot therefore be characterised as 
a sale. He points out that if the surrogate mother and the intending parents 
had merely entered a contract for gestational services, if the surrogate 
mother refused to give up the resulting baby, then the parents would not 
be able to demand delivery of the baby, but only seek monetary damages, 
concluding that this point “reveals the disingenuous nature of the contract for 
services argument.”23 Finally, Tobin argues that to characterise a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement as the mere provision of gestational services is “deeply 
problematic” because it objectifies and commodifies women’s reproductive 
capacity, overlooks the health risks associated with pregnancy, and places the 
surrogate in an invidious position if the intending parents decide they do not 
want the resulting child.24 
Other proponents of the argument that commercial surrogacy amounts 
to an unlawful sale of children include David Smolin who notes that “when 
surrogacy is viewed through the legal lens of adoption, its commercial aspects 
are interpreted as a kind of illicit sale of children.”25 He argues that most 
surrogacy arrangements constitute the sale of children and so should not 
be legally legitimated. Sonia Allan notes that no matter what language is 
used to describe the transaction, no matter how the relationship between the 
surrogate mother and the child is viewed, the literal interpretation of the law 
means that the transaction equates to sale or commodification of children 
21 Tobin, above n 3, at 336-337.
22 Tobin, above n 3, at 335.
23 Tobin, above n 3, at 341.
24 Tobin, above n 3, at 340.
25 Smolin, above n 8, at 303.
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because it amounts to “the delivery of a child to others for remuneration or 
other consideration.”26
 
B. Contract for Reproductive Services (or at least not a Contract for Sale  
of a Child)
Opposing these arguments are those commentators who suggest that 
a surrogacy contract is not a contract for the sale of a child, but instead a 
contract for reproductive services. Proponents of this view sometimes relabel 
surrogate mothers as “gestational carriers,” “surrogate carriers,” or “gestational 
surrogates.”27 Jason Hanna argues that commercial surrogacy involves 
remuneration to the surrogate for her services in carrying and giving birth to 
a child, rather than payment for purchase of a child.28 Jenny Millbank points 
out that the social science evidence demonstrates that payment alone cannot 
be used to differentiate ‘good’ surrogacy arrangements from ‘bad’ ones.29 
Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne build on these perspectives to argue that 
commercial surrogacy is not sale of children. They note that it is clear that 
the object and purpose of the CRC and CRC-OPSC is to “prevent harm to 
children, to protect children’s rights and to promote their best interests.”30 
The list of prohibited acts in the CRC-OPSC (sexual exploitation, transfer 
of organs for profit and forced labour) clearly involve exploitation and 
degradation of the child in a way that surrogacy usually does not.31 The 
Preamble to CRC-OPSC refers to the context of “international traffic in 
children” and so adds weight to the argument that the primary aim of art 35 
and the Protocol is “harmful activities that compromise the best interests of 
the child.”32 Commercial surrogacy is thus described as “wholly different in 
character” to the activities covered by the CRC-OPSC.33 Wade also suggests 
that the CRC and CRC-OPSC seek to guard against practices involving the 
ownership of children which would be detrimental to the enjoyment of their 
26 Sonia Allan “The Surrogate in Commercial Surrogacy: Legal and Ethical Considerations” 
in Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds) Surrogacy, Law and Human Rights (Routledge, 
London, 2016) 113 at 120.
27 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [47].
28 Jason KM Hanna “Revisiting child-based objections to commercial surrogacy” (2010) 24 
Bioethics 341.
29 Jenny Millbank “Rethinking ‘Commercial’ Surrogacy in Australia” (2014) 12 Journal of 
Bioethical Inquiry 477.
30 Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne “Souls in the House of Tomorrow: The Rights of Children 
Born via Surrogacy” in Paula Gerber and Katie O’Byrne (eds) Surrogacy, Law and Human 
Rights (Routledge, London, 2016) 81 at 97.
31 Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 30, at 97.
32 Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 30, at 97.
33 Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 30, at 97.
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rights, and that if this perspective is applied, commercial surrogacy cannot be 
said to contravene the prohibition on the sale of children.34
Supporting the view that a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not a 
contract for sale of children is the practical point that a surrogacy contract 
is agreed before a child is even conceived, even though a healthy child is the 
desired outcome at the end of the contract. In other words, in view of the 
perils of conception and pregnancy, it may be that the intended ‘product’ of 
a commercial surrogacy arrangement, i.e. a healthy child, may not ultimately 
be delivered. Equally, many surrogacy contracts provide for payments to the 
surrogate mother at various stages of the pregnancy as opposed to a single 
lump sum upon delivery of the child. In addition, it is argued that there is 
no sale of children in gestational surrogacy arrangements because of the lack 
of a genetic relationship between the surrogate mother and the child, i.e. the 
child is not ‘hers’ to sell.35
If a commercial surrogacy arrangement is not a contract for sale of a child, 
then what sort of contract is it? Some commentators simply assert that it is 
not a contract for sale of a child, but do not go further to explain what it is a 
contract for. Others explicitly assert or imply that it is instead a contract for 
reproductive services. For example, Hanna argues that intending parents in 
a commercial surrogacy arrangement are paying a surrogate mother for her 
reproductive labour.36 If this is the case, then it raises separate issues beyond 
the scope of this chapter around possible exploitation of the surrogate mother 
and issues of gender equality. 
A compelling argument is put forward by Gerber and O’Byrne who 
say that commercial surrogacy is not about ‘sale’ or ‘transfer’ of a child, 
but instead about “allocation of responsibility between the parties to the 
arrangement as to the care of the child at different points in time, with the 
aim of bringing to child into its intended family.”37 Thus,  where a commercial 
surrogacy arrangement has reached the courts, subject to the national legal 
framework in an individual case, the courts have typically not approached 
the arrangement as a contract for sale, a contract for services, or engaged in a 
discussion of specific performance or contractual purpose. Instead, they have 
made determinations about allocation of responsibility for care of the child 
based on the best interests of the child.38
 
34 Katherine Wade “The regulation of surrogacy: a children’s rights perspective” (2017) 29 
CFLQ 113 at 121.
35 Allan, above n 26, at 117.
36 Hanna, above n 28.
37 Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 30, at 98.
38 Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 30, at 99.
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C. Just Regulate!
Many commentators either set to one side or avoid commenting altogether 
on whether or not a commercial surrogacy contract amounts to sale of a child, 
and instead take a realist position that commercial surrogacy is happening 
and then consider how best to regulate it so as to mitigate its various 
potentially adverse impacts. For example, Claire Achmad largely leaves to one 
side the issue of whether commercial surrogacy amounts to sale of children, 
and considers how international commercial surrogacy might be regulated 
to better protect the rights of children. She is however of the opinion that:39
although not all instances of ICS [international commercial surrogacy] amount 
to sale of children, in some instances ICS arrangements are being undertaken in ways 
that fall within the definition of ‘sale of children’ under public international law. 
She suggests that whether a specific surrogacy arrangement amounts to 
sale of children “depends on the facts of the situation involved, in particular 
the payment structure of the ICS arrangement in relation to the transfer of 
the child.”40 While approaches which leave the issue of sale of children to 
one side are understandable, they also seem a little presumptive – after all, 
if commercial surrogacy per se is regarded as unlawful sale of children, then 
issues of regulation may be largely redundant. The argument is that CRC 
and CRC-OPSC can be seen as fully ‘regulating’ the issue by prohibiting 
commercial surrogacy. There is likely to be little demand for cross-border 
altruistic surrogacy, and so no corresponding need for international regulation, 
aside perhaps from regulating to address the consequences of illegal surrogacy. 
Tobin argues that the idea that “mere regulation” of commercial surrogacy 
is a pragmatic response to the dilemmas associated with the practice is 
misplaced.41
Despite this perspective, there are currently two initiatives underway 
which are premised on the ‘just regulate’ approach, and seemingly leave 
to one side the threshold issue of whether commercial surrogacy amounts 
to unlawful sale of children. The Hague Conference is currently studying 
private international law issues in relation to the legal parentage of children, 
and in relation to international surrogacy arrangements specifically. An 
Experts’ Group has been established, and although it has met three times 
since 2016, progress is slow, and surrogacy arrangements are not due to be 
39 Claire Achmad “Children’s Rights in International Commercial Surrogacy: Exploring the 
challenges from a child rights, public international human rights law perspective” (PhD 
thesis, Leiden University, 2018) at 353. See also Claire Achmad “Contextualising a 21st 
century challenge: part one: understanding international commercial surrogacy and the 
parties whose rights and interests are at stake in the public international law context” [2012] 
NZFLJ 190; Achmad, above n 10.
40 Achmad “Children’s Rights in International Commercial Surrogacy”, above n 39, at 353.
41 Tobin, above n 3, at 351.
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discussed until its February 2020 meeting.42 The ultimate aim of the work 
of the Hague Conference is the development of an international treaty. The 
ISS is an international non-governmental organisation (NGO) that assists 
children and families confronted with social problems in the migration 
context. The ISS also has a surrogacy project with an Experts’ Group that is 
in the process of developing “Principles for a better protection of children’s 
rights in cross-border reproductive arrangements, in particular international 
surrogacy.”43 This project has also been running since 2016, but the proposed 
Principles are not yet finalised.44 Although neither of these initiatives has yet 
made clear its position on whether commercial surrogacy amounts to sale of 
children, both appear to be taking a ‘just regulate’ approach.
From this review of existing literature and initiatives, it is apparent that 
whether or not commercial surrogacy amounts to the sale of children under 
international law is unresolved and deeply contested. In this context then, 
what has the Committee on the Rights of the Child - the body charged with 
monitoring and oversight of CRC and CRC-OPSC - had to say on the issue?
IV. The Lacuna: the Tentative Views of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is yet to issue a definitive 
statement on whether or not commercial surrogacy per se amounts to 
unlawful sale of a child contrary to art 35 CRC and CRC-OPSC. However, 
since 2013, the Committee has, in its concluding observations on the periodic 
reports of individual states, made some tentative observations on the practice. 
A. Concluding Observations 2013-2018
The first comments of the Committee that directly address surrogacy 
appear in its 2013 concluding observations on the second report of the United 
States under the CRC-OPSC (to which the United States is a party, even 
though it remains a non-party to CRC). The Committee noted that it was 
particularly concerned about “the absence of federal legislation with regard 
42 For more information, see HCCH “The Parentage / Surrogacy Project” <www.hcch.net/
en/projects/legislative-projects/parentage-surrogacy>. New Zealand’s representative on the 
Experts’ Group on the Parentage/Surrogacy Project is Margaret Casey QC.
43 International Social Service Network “Call for Action 2016: Urgent need for regulation of 
International surrogacy and artificial reproductive technologies” (January 2016) <http://
www.iss-ssi.org/index.php/en/what-we-do-en/surrogacy>.
44 For more information, see International Social Service Network, above n 43.
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to surrogacy, which if not clearly regulated, amounts to sale of children.”45 
Also in 2013, in its concluding observations on Israel, the Committee noted 
its concern “when regulating surrogate motherhood arrangements, the State 
party has paid insufficient attention to the rights and interests of children 
born as a result of assisted reproduction technologies, particularly with the 
involvement of surrogate mothers.” The Committee recommended that:46
in the regulation of assisted reproduction technologies, particularly with the 
involvement of surrogate mothers, the State party ensure respect for the rights of 
children to have their best interests taken as a primary consideration and to have 
access to information about their origins.
The Committee also recommended that Israel “consider providing 
surrogate mothers and prospective parents with appropriate counselling and 
support.”47 
In 2014, the Committee considered surrogacy in India. Although the 
Committee welcomed India’s 2011 guidelines on the adoption of children, 
it also noted its concern that “[c]ommercial use of surrogacy, which is not 
properly regulated, is widespread” and recommended that India:48  
[e]nsure that the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill, 2013, or 
other subsequent legislation contain provisions which define, regulate and monitor 
surrogacy arrangements and criminalizes [sic] the sale of children for the purpose of 
illegal adoption, including the misuse of surrogacy. 
In its contemporaneous concluding observations on India’s first report 
under CRC-OPSC, the Committee recorded its concern at “[t]he widespread 
commercial use of surrogacy, including international surrogacy, which is 
violating various rights of children and can lead to the sale of children.”49
The following year, the Committee noted its concern in relation to Mexico 
that “the regulation on surrogacy in the State of Tabasco does not provide 
sufficient safeguards to prevent surrogacy from being used as a means to sell 
children” and recommended that Mexico “ensure that the State of Tabasco 
reviews its legislation on surrogacy and introduces safeguards to prevent its 
45 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the second periodic report of 
the United States of America submitted under article 12 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC/C/OPSC/USA/CO/2, 2 
July 2013) at [29(b)].
46 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the second to fourth periodic 
reports of Israel (CRC/C/ISR/CO/2-4, 4 July 2013) at [33]-[34].
47 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n 46, at [34].
48 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the combined third and 
fourth periodic reports of India (CRC/C/CRC/IND/CO/3-4, 7 July 2014) at [57(d)] and 
[58(d)].
49 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the report submitted by 
India under article 12, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC/C/OPSC/IND/
CO/1, 7 July 2014) at [23(g)].
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use for the sale of children.”50 At the same session, the Committee considered 
the first report of Israel under CRC-OPSC. It noted the efforts of Israel 
to regulate international surrogacy arrangements but recorded its concern 
that “there is no appropriate procedure for screening prospective parent(s) of 
children born to surrogate mothers abroad, aimed at preventing the hidden 
sale of children and/or possible sexual abuse” and recommended that Israel 
“put in place more stringent policies to secure the protection of children born 
through international surrogacy arrangements.”51
In 2017, the Committee issued concluding observations on Georgia. 
Surrogacy is mentioned by the Committee in the context of identity and 
nationality rights (arts 7-8 CRC). The Committee referred to the regulation 
of birth registration of children born in Georgia via surrogacy under a new 
2016 decree and recommended that Georgia address possible obstacles to the 
decree, especially with regard to international surrogacy arrangements; ensure 
that a child born through surrogacy will be able to get access to information 
about his/her origin; amend the law on status of aliens and stateless persons 
to fully comply with the provisions of the Convention relating to the Status 
of Stateless Persons; establish an identification and referral mechanism for 
children who are undocumented and at risk of statelessness; and accede to 
the European Convention on Nationality 1997 and the Council of Europe 
Convention on the avoidance of statelessness in relation to State succession 
2006.52 Interestingly, in the section of the observations dealing with “special 
protection measures” (including under art 35 CRC), although there were 
a number of recommendations for Georgia to combat exploitation, sale, 
abduction and trafficking in children, there was no specific mention of 
surrogacy.53
Commercial surrogacy was, however, a focus of the Committee in 
its subsequent consideration of the United States. Before its interactive 
dialogue with the United States’ delegation, the Committee explicitly sought 
information about pre-birth payments and pre-conception contracts.54 It 
sought information on the action taken “to explicitly prohibit payments 
before birth and other expenses to surrogate mothers...”. The Committee 
asked for an indication of “how the legalization, in some states, of pre-
50 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the combined fourth and 
fifth periodic reports of Mexico (CRC/C/MEX/CO/4-5, 3 July 2015) at [69(b)] and [70(b)].
51 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the report submitted by Israel 
under article 12(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC/C/OPSC/ISR/CO/1, 13 July 
2015) at [28]-[29].
52 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of 
Georgia (CRC/C/GEO/CO/4, 9 March 2017) at [19].
53 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n 52, at [42].
54 Committee on the Rights of the Child List of issues in relation to the report submitted by the 
United States of America under article 12(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC/C/
OPSC/USA/Q/3-4, 8 November 2016) at [7].
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conception contracts between commissioning parents and surrogate mothers 
is compatible with the State’s obligation to prevent the sale of children” and an 
explanation of how those contracts were being enforced. In reply, the United 
States asserted that surrogacy did not appear to fall within the scope of the 
CRC-OPSC because it did not involve any of the forms of exploitation listed 
in art 3 CRC-OPSC.55 Disappointingly, the Committee did not directly 
address this argument and instead recommended that the United States:56
consider the possibility of developing legislation that would address the issue of 
sale of children that may take place in the context of surrogate motherhood and that 
is outside the scope of family law. 
The Committee also noted that surrogate motherhood is a complex 
area that raises many different questions that fall outside the scope of the 
CRC-OPSC, but expressed its concern that “widespread commercial use of 
surrogacy … may lead, under certain circumstances, to the sale of children.” 
The Committee was also concerned about “the situations when parentage 
issues are decided exclusively on a contractual basis at pre-conception or pre-
birth stage.”57 
The most recent comments by the Committee were in July 2018, in its 
concluding observations on Russia’s first report under CRC-OPSC.  The 
Committee noted that surrogate motherhood was a “complex area that 
raises many different questions,” and that “in the light of articles 1 and 2 
of the Optional Protocol the Committee recommends that the State party 
strengthen its legislation in order to prevent surrogacy arrangements that may 
lead to the sale of a child.”58
Other countries which have been reasonably involved in commercial 
surrogacy arrangements, with either an established or emerging surrogacy 
industry, or intending parents travelling overseas for international commercial 
surrogacy arrangements, which have not to date received any comment 
from the Committee in this context are Armenia, Cambodia, Guatemala 
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Nepal, Thailand, Uganda and Ukraine. There has been 
no comment by the Committee on New Zealand’s approach to commercial 
surrogacy. The lack of comment by the Committee on these countries may 
55 Committee on the Rights of the Child List of issues in relation to the report submitted by the 
United States under article 12(1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography - Addendum (CRC/C/
OPSC/USA/Q/3-4/Add.1, 23 March 2017) at [35].
56 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the combined third and 
fourth reports submitted by the United States of America under article 12(1) of the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography (CRC/C/OPSC/USA/CO/3-4, 12 July 2017) at [25].
57 Committee on the Rights of the Child, above n 56, at [24].
58 Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding observations on the report submitted by the 
Russian Federation under article 12 (1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (CRC/C/OPSC/
RUS/CO/1, 3 July 2018) at [22].
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however be partly attributed to the timing of state reports, i.e. the state’s most 
recent engagement with the Committee may have been before commercial 
surrogacy developed in that country.
 
B. Individual Communications involving Surrogacy
Since April 2014, when the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on a Communications Procedure entered into 
force, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has been able to consider 
communications from individuals alleging breaches of CRC or CRC-OPSC. 
To date, only one decision of the Committee under this Protocol has raised 
issues of surrogacy. In JABS v Costa Rica, the complainant father challenged 
the way in which the Costa Rican authorities recorded the birth of his twin 
sons, born via a surrogacy arrangement.59 The sons were born in California, 
by means of in vitro fertilisation, using a donor’s ovum and the father’s sperm, 
with the pregnancy carried to term by a surrogate mother. The Supreme 
Court of California issued a pre-birth order declaring the father to be the sole 
legal parent. However, the sons’ United States birth certificates contained two 
surnames: the author’s first surname and the egg donor’s maiden name. The 
egg donor had agreed to disclose her identity to allow for the possibility that, 
when the boys reached 18, they could contact her if they so desired. However, 
when the father and his sons returned to Costa Rica, the authorities assigned 
the boys their father’s two surnames and did not include the egg donor’s 
maiden name. The father alleged that this was a violation of art 8 CRC 
and the right of his sons to have full knowledge of their biological origins. 
However, in a surprisingly brief decision, the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child found the communication to be inadmissible, noting that the 
father had failed to demonstrate that the Costa Rican approach constituted a 
barrier to his sons’ ability to have full knowledge of their biological origins or 
breached their right to preserve their identity.60 
There is one case pending before the Committee that is noted as involving 
art 35 CRC, although the description of the case suggests it concerns a 
custodial dispute.61
C. Comment on the Approach of the Committee
The views of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, at least as derived 
from its concluding observations, are somewhat enigmatic. However, three 
points can be made. First, and very disappointingly, the Committee failed 
59 JABS v Costa Rica (CRC/C/74/D/5/2016, 1 March 2017).
60 JABS v Costa Rica, above n 59, at [4.2].
61 See Case against Spain 13/2017 in Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
“Table of pending cases before the Committee on the Rights of the Child” <https://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRC/TablePendingCases.pdf>.
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to engage directly with the argument made by the United States (and by a 
number of commentators as noted above) that surrogacy does not fall within 
the scope of CRC-OPSC because it does not involve exploitative conduct. 
This issue is at the heart of whether or not commercial surrogacy amounts to 
sale of children, and it was an opportunity missed for the Committee not to 
engage directly on this question. Secondly, the Committee clearly harbours 
concerns that at least under ‘certain circumstances’ which it suggests involve an 
absence of ‘clear’ or ‘proper’ regulation, commercial surrogacy arrangements 
‘may’ amount to sale or ‘hidden sale’ of children. Regrettably, the Committee 
has not gone much further to explain these circumstances, or indicate what 
would be acceptable as clear or proper regulation although there is clearly 
a concern with pre-conception contracts and pre-birth payments. Thirdly, 
the Committee has identified other child rights issues arising from surrogacy 
beyond the threshold issue of sale of children including issues around identity 
and nationality (statelessness) of a child born via surrogacy.
Thus, it seems that the Committee’s views can best be described as 
nascent. As pointed out by Wade, it remains unclear whether the Committee’s 
comments on inadequate regulation refer to the failure to ban commercial 
surrogacy outright or instead suggest that commercial surrogacy is permissible 
provided it is well regulated.62 Although it is tempting to conclude that 
the Committee is tending towards the latter approach of recognising that 
commercial surrogacy is here to stay, and so needs to be properly regulated, 
recent comments by Olga Khazova, Vice Chair of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, suggest that the Committee’s views are still evolving. 
At a 2018 side event at the United Nations Human Rights Council on 
surrogacy and sale of children held following release of the Report of the 
Special Rapporteur (discussed below), Khazova described the Committee’s 
position as “still developing.”63 She referred to “the importance of a human 
rights approach to designing laws on surrogate motherhood and of taking 
measures for the prohibition of sale of children.”64 She also noted that the 
Committee was clear on a number of key aspects, including the right of 
surrogate born children not to be discriminated against, the right of children 
to get access to information about their origins, and a need for appropriate 
screening procedures for prospective parents of children born via international 
surrogacy arrangements.65 Notable by omission from this list is that there is 
no reference to sale of children – suggesting that the Committee’s views on 
this key threshold issue are not yet fixed.
That the Committee is yet to reach a definitive view on whether commercial 
surrogacy amounts to sale of children is confirmed by its February 2019 Draft 
62 Wade, above n 34, at 120.
63 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “Summary of side event on surrogacy 
and the sale of children” (6 March 2018) <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Children/
Pages/SurrogacySummary.aspx>.
64 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 63.
65 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 63.
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Guidelines on the Implementation of CRC-OPSC. Surrogacy is mentioned 
in only one paragraph of these draft guidelines, where the Committee 
notes that “[w]hile not all forms of surrogacy constitute sale of children, the 
practice, in particular in its commercial form, may have this effect.”66 The 
Committee encourages states “to regulate this practice to avoid any form of 
sale of children under surrogacy arrangements.”67
 
D. Contrast: the Views of the Special Rapporteur 
In notable contrast to the tentative views of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, the Special Rapporteur on the sale and sexual exploitation 
of children has been far more definitive on the question of whether or not 
commercial surrogacy amounts to unlawful sale of children. Appointed 
in 2014, the current Special Rapporteur, Maud de Boer-Buquicchio, has 
ensured that surrogacy is a key focus of her mandate. In her 2016 report, 
which focused primarily on illegal adoptions, she noted that children born 
via international commercial surrogacy were often “vulnerable to breaches 
of their rights, and the practice often amounts to the sale of children and 
may lead to illegal adoption.”68 Subsequently, in the report on her visit to 
Georgia, she noted that a new trend of unregulated international commercial 
surrogacy arrangements was taking place within Georgia, with a negative 
impact on the rights and best interests of children resulting in “irregularities 
and protection gaps.”69
More recently, her 2018 report is a tour de force with a thematic study 
on surrogacy and sale of children.70 In it, the Special Rapporteur asserts 
that commercial surrogacy often involves abusive practices, and that current 
responses to regulating commercial surrogacy involve direct challenges to 
the legitimacy of human rights norms by purporting to legalise practices 
that violate the international prohibition on the sale of children.71 She 
unequivocally rejects the notion that there is a “right to a child” under 
international law.72 She notes that surrogacy regulations in some jurisdictions 
are designed to enforce contracts, obtain children for intending parents, 
maintain the industry’s profits, and intentionally reject most protections for 
66 Committee on the Rights of the Child “Draft Guidelines on the Implementation of the 
Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography – 
Draft 0” (February 2019) at [52].
67 Ibid.
68 United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography (A/HRC/34/55, 22 December 2016) at [52].
69 United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, 
child prostitution and child pornography on her visit to Georgia (A/HRC/34/55/Add.1, 21 
December 2016) at [10] and [40]-[41].
70 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4.
71 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [24].
72 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [64]-[65].
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children or surrogate mothers.73 Ultimately, she concludes that “the essence” 
of the commercial surrogacy arrangement is the transfer of a child and that 
“[c]ommercial surrogacy as currently practised usually constitutes sale of 
children as defined under international human rights law.”74
However, she agrees that:75 
[c]ommercial surrogacy could be conducted in a way that does not constitute 
sale of children, if it were clear that the surrogate mother was only being paid for 
gestational services and not for the transfer of the child. 
She sets out a number of conditions to be met in order for this to be more 
than a “legal fiction”76 including that surrogate mothers must be accorded the 
status of the mother at birth, and at birth must be under no contractual or legal 
obligation to legally or physically transfer the child. In the view of the Special 
Rapporteur, the physical transfer of the child “must be a gratuitous act, based 
on her own post-birth intentions, rather than on any legal or contractual 
obligation.”77 Thus, all payments to the surrogate must be before the post-
birth legal or physical transfer of the child, and must be non-reimbursable. 
She asserts that unless and until clear regulatory systems are established, 
states should prohibit commercial surrogacy. In particular, states should not 
adopt commercial surrogacy regulations based on obligatory or automatic 
enforcement of surrogacy contracts and pre-birth parentage orders, for such 
would make the States “complicit in authorizing practices that constitute the 
sale of children.”78 The transfer of a child from the surrogate to the intending 
parent(s) must be a gratuitous act, otherwise it will be characterised as an 
unlawful ‘sale’ of a child.
V. The Call to Action: Why a General Comment is Imperative 
In light of the emphatic views of the Special Rapporteur, it is now essential 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child take some action of its own. The 
logical step for the Committee to take is to issue a general comment. In 
common with other treaty bodies, as part of its mandate, the Committee is 
able to issue “general comments.”79 General comments provide authoritative 
interpretive guidance on the treaty obligations of states. They can serve a 
number of purposes, including legal analysis, policy recommendation and 
73 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [33].
74 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [41].
75 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [72] (emphasis added).
76 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [72] and [75].
77 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [72].
78 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [75]. 
79 CRC, art 45(d).
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practice direction.80 General comments typically address either a thematic 
issue (more common) or a specific article of the CRC (less common).81 
It could be argued that it would be premature for the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child to issue a general comment on surrogacy, and that it 
would instead be better to wait for the work of other organisations such as 
the Hague Conference or the ISS to progress. However, there are a number of 
compelling reasons why the Committee should act now. First, and foremost, 
unlike other parties involved in surrogacy arrangements (including intending 
parents, surrogate mothers, and surrogacy brokers) children born as a result 
of surrogacy lack any independent agency or voice to advocate for their 
own rights and best interests, which leaves them especially vulnerable. The 
Committee needs to fill this gap and speak on their behalf. Secondly, the work 
of the Hague Conference and ISS is progressing slowly and seems unlikely to 
result in either a comprehensive international agreement or guiding principles 
any time soon. Even at the regional level, where it might be expected that 
agreement could be more easily reached, a recent attempt by the Council 
of Europe to adopt a position on surrogacy was unsuccessful, even though 
a majority of states favoured either prohibiting commercial surrogacy or 
prohibiting all surrogacy.82 Of course, given the multi-dimensional nature of 
surrogacy issues, the Committee on the Rights of the Child may be no more 
successful at making quick progress or reaching a consensus view, but this is 
not a reason to preclude an attempt being made. 
Another very practical reason why the Committee should issue a 
general comment is because of the different ways in which the Committee’s 
(in-)action has been characterised to date. For example, relying on the 
Committee’s comments on India (noted above), Gerber and O’Byrne suggest 
that the Committee has considered “substantial evidence on the practice of 
compensated surrogacy” and:83  
restricted its findings to the context of unlawful adoption where there is a lack of 
regulation, and … not made any statement to the effect that compensated surrogacy 
constitutes the sale of children per se. 
On the other hand, Tobin suggests that “limited significance” should be 
read into the (then) silence of human rights monitoring bodies, because they 
80 Helen Keller and Leena Grover “General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and 
their legitimacy” in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds) UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 116 at 143.
81 For example, in recent years the Committee has issued general comments on children in 
street situations and on public budgeting for the realisation of children’s rights. Committee 
on the Rights of the Child  General Comment No 21 on children in street situations (CRC/C/
GC/21, 2017); Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No 19 on public 
budgeting for the realization of children’s rights (art 4) (CRC/C/GC/19, 2016).
82 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [20]. 
83 Gerber and O’Byrne, above n 30, at 96-97.
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are instead preoccupied with more exploitative and harmful ways in which 
children are sold and trafficked.84  
A final reason why the Committee should issue a general comment now 
is that if the Committee on the Rights of the Child were to draw a line in 
the sand and boldly and definitively assert that commercial surrogacy per se 
amounts to prohibited sale of children, then this would be essential input 
into the work of the Hague Conference and the ISS. Indeed, it may render 
their work largely redundant: if the argument that commercial surrogacy 
per se amounts to sale of children is accepted in its strongest form, then 
logically, there is little need for further international agreement on the issue, 
as the matter could be seen as fully regulated by art 35 CRC and CRC-
OPSC, i.e. commercial surrogacy would be prohibited because it amounts to 
the unlawful sale of children. With limited cross-border interest in altruistic 
surrogacy, there could be little need for an international agreement, aside 
perhaps from an agreement about how to deal with the consequences of 
illegal surrogacy arrangements. 
A practical challenge in developing a general comment would be reaching 
consensus amongst the 18 expert members of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child on its substantive content. Achmad has pointed out that 
reaching a definitive view under international law on whether commercial 
surrogacy amounts to sale of children will be difficult.85 One of the reasons 
for the Committee’s tentative and cautious approach to date may be a lack 
of consensus amongst its members on surrogacy issues. Bantekas and Oette 
have noted that although there is an established process for adoption of a new 
general comment:86
In practice, general comments are the outcome of particular dynamics within the 
treaty body. Is there a readiness to use general comments generally or in relation to 
a particular issue? Who is taking the lead? How well informed and capable are the 
drafters? And how successfully does the body overcome any differences to produce 
an authoritative draft?
Aside from the internal dynamics of the Committee, the process for 
adopting a general comment is typically transparent and consultative.87 Draft 
general comments are usually circulated for feedback. The Committee on the 
Rights of the Child has often held a Day of General Discussion to get wide 
civil society input into the drafting of a general comment.88 The Committee 
also benefits from the preparatory work of experts of UN agencies such as 
84 Tobin, above n 3, at 338.
85 Achmad “Children’s Rights in International Commercial Surrogacy”, above n 39, at 353.
86 Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette International Human Rights Law and Practice (2nd ed, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016) at 209.
87 United Nations General Assembly Report of the Chairs of the human rights treaty bodies on their 
twenty-seventh meeting (A/70/302, 7 August 2015) at [91].
88 Jaap E Doek “The CRC: Dynamics and Directions of Monitoring its Implementation” in 
Antonella Invernizzi and Jane Williams (eds) The Human Rights of Children: From Visions to 
Implementation (Ashgate, Farnham, 2011) 99 at 105.
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the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(OHCHR) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF).89 In the case of a general comment on surrogacy, the 
Committee will be able to draw on the work of the Special Rapporteur, as 
well as that of Hague Conference and ISS. It may also make sense for the 
Committee to explore the possibility of issuing a joint general comment 
with the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW Committee).90 
If the Committee on the Rights of the Child were ultimately successful in 
reaching agreement and issuing a general comment on surrogacy, a number 
of benefits would follow. A general comment would provide authoritative 
guidance to states in determining their own national regulatory responses 
to surrogacy. Importantly, this would be using a children’s rights lens. 
Although the Committee’s general comments are only soft law and so not 
legally binding, they are nevertheless a “vital tool” for the interpretation of 
treaty obligations and act as “key reference points” for states.91 Given that 
artificial reproduction is such a fast-evolving area, the non-binding nature of 
a general comment may in fact be a blessing, as it will not lock the Committee 
permanently into one fixed interpretation.
A second benefit of a general comment is that the Committee is able 
to use its general comments to evaluate the compliance of states with their 
obligations under the CRC. The Committee can refer to its general comments 
in its subsequent concluding observations on state reports.92 In this regard, 
although the Special Rapporteur’s report on surrogacy is impressive, it simply 
will not engage the attention of states in the same way that a general comment 
would. A general comment will speak much more directly to the 196 states 
that have ratified CRC and the 175 states that have ratified the CRC-OPSC.93 
Even though little is known about how states use the general comments of 
treaty bodies,94 and there is no systematic follow-up to ensure that states take 
into account general comments, a treaty body at least has more tools at its 
disposal than the Special Rapporteur to engage in ongoing monitoring and 
encourage states to implement a general comment.
General comments are also regularly used as a source of guidance in 
international and national judicial or quasi-judicial processes. States and 
89 Doek, above n 88, at 106.
90 See, for example, Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women and 
Committee on the Rights of the Child Joint General Recommendation No 31 of the Committee 
on Elimination of Discrimination against Women and General Comment No 18 of the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child on harmful practices (CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18, 14 
November 2014).
91 Bantekas and Oette, above n 86, at 209-210.
92 Doek, above n 88, at 105.
93 Ratification numbers are as at the time of writing. For up-to-date ratification numbers, see 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights “Status of Ratification: Interactive 
Dashboard” <http://indicators.ohchr.org/>.
94 Doek, above n 88, at 106.
Commercial Surrogacy and the Sale of Children: A Call to Action for the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child
135
complainants often invoke general comments in individual complaints 
processes, and national courts increasingly refer to general comments of 
treaty bodies in domestic judgments.95 Finally, a general comment would also 
be useful as guidance to the myriad of other actors involved in commercial 
surrogacy - surrogate mothers, intending parents, genetic donor parents, 
medical practitioners, lawyers, judges, surrogacy brokers and social workers.96
It is not the aim of this chapter to put forward suggested content of such a 
general comment; that is ultimately the job of the Committee itself. However, 
there is clearly much groundwork in the comprehensive 2018 report of the 
Special Rapporteur that could form the basis of a general comment by the 
Committee, especially on the threshold issue of whether commercial surrogacy 
amounts to unlawful sale of children, and the conditions which might be 
appropriate in order for it to be lawful.97 The next step is for the Committee to 
decide whether it agrees with the Special Rapporteur’s approach, and to make 
its stance clear by way of a general comment. Beyond this key threshold issue, 
Achmad has proposed a wide-ranging framework for a general comment on 
surrogacy,98 and so her work will be a valuable resource for the Committee, 
along with that of myriad other academic commentators. Given the highly 
contentious nature of surrogacy, the drafting process will be important, and 
so Keller and Grover’s study, which offers a number of suggestions for the 
drafting process in order to enhance the normative legitimacy of the resulting 
general comment, offers useful guidance.99
In the meantime, at the very least, and as already suggested by the 
Special Rapporteur, the Committee on the Rights of the Child should 
request states to provide information about concerns relating to commercial 
surrogacy arrangements as part of their regular periodic reporting.100 The 
Committee should amend its current guidelines for states on reporting on 
the implementation of CRC-OPSC to include an explicit requirement for 
information on commercial surrogacy.101 This information would help the 
95 Jane Connors “United Nations” in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and Sandesh Sivakumaran 
(eds) International Human Rights Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018) 369 at 
392.
96 Achmad “Children’s Rights in International Commercial Surrogacy”, above n 39, at 350.
97 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4.
98 Achmad “Children’s Rights in International Commercial Surrogacy”, above n 39, at 340-
349.
99 Keller and Grover, above n 80, at 192-194.
100 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 68, at [99].
101 Committee on the Rights of the Child Revised guidelines regarding initial reports to be submitted 
by states parties under article 12, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (CRC/C/
OPSC/2, 3 November 2006); Committee on the Rights of the Child Treaty-specific guidelines 
regarding the form and content of periodic reports to be submitted by states parties under article 
44, paragraph 1(b), of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC/C/58/Rev.3, 3 March 
2015).
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Committee to become familiar with the issues and be useful background 
information in formulating a general comment. 
VI. Conclusion
The complexities of commercial surrogacy, and the correspondingly 
slow pace at which the international community is inching towards some 
sort of international framework undoubtedly illustrate some of the limits of 
international law in dealing with multi-faceted, cross-border and fast-evolving 
areas such as artificial reproduction. Similarly, the way in which surrogacy 
and other artificial reproduction developments have outpaced national 
laws, and effectively left international commercial surrogacy arrangements 
either unregulated or only lightly regulated at the national level, also suggest 
that there is a gap to fill. Given the fundamental and threshold nature of 
the question of whether or not commercial surrogacy amounts to sale of 
children, it is imperative for the Committee on the Rights of the Child to 
issue a general comment on the matter sooner rather than later. As pointed 
out by the Special Rapporteur, the current largely demand-driven system is 
endangering the rights of children.102 
The main aim of this chapter has been to examine the Committee’s 
engagement to date on the issue of commercial surrogacy, and argue that it 
is time for the Committee to be more proactive in this space. This chapter 
does not advocate a view one way or the other on the content of a general 
comment; that is the responsibility of the Committee. However, it is worth 
observing that given the lack of a consensus on whether or not commercial 
surrogacy amounts to sale of children, perhaps the moderate centrist 
position will ultimately be confirmed by the Committee, i.e. commercial 
surrogacy is happening, and provided certain conditions are complied with, 
it is permissible and should be regulated accordingly. Although the Special 
Rapporteur is adamant that much of the way in which commercial surrogacy 
is currently practised amounts to unlawful sale of children, she does indicate 
a way forward for commercial surrogacy under certain conditions. Such an 
approach would avoid the risks of a totally prohibitionist stance that the 
practice then goes underground and does even more harm to the rights of 
children (and surrogate mothers).
The Committee on the Rights of the Child is strongly urged to fully engage 
with this issue, and go beyond its tentative approach to date. As the guardian 
of the CRC and the CRC-OPSC, the Committee must stop prevaricating 
and instead start putting some public international law pegs in the ground to 
frame the development of the law and practice on surrogacy. In particular, an 
authoritative interpretation from the Committee on art 35 CRC and CRC-
OPSC is overdue. For the Committee to continue to sit on the sidelines of 
this contentious issue would be an abdication of its duty. 
102 United Nations Human Rights Council, above n 4, at [13].
